Changes in informal society and slavery during the Chosun-Era in Korea
Heeho Kim
nature humanities and social sciences communications
19 October 2022
1
See Lee Ki-baik (1968) for further information on slavery in various periods of Korean History.
Subsequently, the government conferred these public slaves to the noble class in the nineth and tenth centuries, thus engendering the practice of privately owned slaves. 2
2
Only the noble class were allowed to own slaves during the Sung dynasty of China (960–1279).
Slavery in Korea was distinct from that in Africa, wherein enslavement was usually through kidnapping and seizing (e.g., Nunn, 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011).3
Nunn N (2008) The long-term effects of Africa’s slave trades”.
Nunn N, Wantchekon L (2011) The slave trade and the origins of mistrust in Africa.
People in the Chosun era (1392–1910) of Korea were divided into four social classes that were determined by heredity: the elites (Yangban), the middle class (Chungin), commoners (Sangmin), and slaves (Nobi).5
5
A new working class, the Korean Chonmin, emerged in the fourteenth and fifteenth century as large farmlands were developed. They were not slaves but free men who had to work to sustain their livelihoods; thus, they were economically enslaved. However, they disappeared soon after the enactment of the Jongcheon law in 1430.
While the government owned numerous public slaves during this period (e.g., 450,000 slaves in 1467),slaves were also privately owned by the elites, middle class, and commoners.
The Jongcheon law between 1430 and 1731 stated that a child was a slave if either parent was a slave, regardless of the status of the other parent
6.
See Hong (1981) for changes in the slave population in Chosun-era Korea.
The population of slaves varied over the period, ranging from 25–40% of the total population prior to 1731 (Kwon and Shin, 1977).7
7
According to Kwon and Shin (1977), the total population of Korea in the early eighteenth century was estimated to have increased from 16.3 million in 1717 to 18.5 million in 1804. However, it dramatically dropped down to 16.2 million in 1825 due to pandemics and civil wars, and then went back to 16.7 million in 1867.
The Korean government changed the regulations governing slaves’ status in 1731 by switching from the Jongcheon law to the Jongyang law. The new slave regulation, Jongyang, stated that a child was a slave only if the mother was a slave, regardless of the status of the child’s father.
This effectively elevated some children—who otherwise would have been potential slaves—to a tax-paying, commoner status.
The dramatic decrease in the number of slaves did not satisfy the small ruling elite class (e.g., Choi, 1978; Ji, 1995).8
8
Refer to Choi (1978) and Ji (1995) for state policy regarding slavery during early Chosun-era Korea.
Notably, slavery was officially abolished in 1894 by law (Gapo).
This conflict would lead to a shift in the institution of slavery towards an alternative equilibrium (North, 1990; Ogilvie, 2007). 9
9
In a conflict-based approach to institutional change, Ogilvie (2007) states that economies with similar resources and technologies develop along different paths because of the game rules in a society or distribution effects of institutions. Institutions affect economic efficiency and the distribution of resources. Some groups want to maintain the current institutions and others want change. The results of this conflict are affected by its distributional implication for the most powerful individuals or groups (the elites or king). An efficient outcome is possible only when all social groups involved negotiate a binding agreement, but this assumes an enforcing party with a monopoly on physical violence. Since no other party can enforce the agreement, the party with a monopoly on the use of physical violence will be under constant temptation to use its capacity to cheat, exploit, or oppress others.
The number of slaves declined rapidly thereafter (Pyung, 1982; Park, 2007). The number of slaves in Korea is estimated to have been 6.9 million in the seventeenth century, declining to 0.1 million by 1867 (Choi, 1974).
This study explores the role of slave desertion to examine the relationship between the regulation change regarding children’s status as slaves,the institution of slavery, and society.
Our hypothesis posits that as more slaves deserted to the informal sectors, the costs of monitoring slaves increased.
Frequent slave desertions reduced slave demand, and dismantled the hierarchical status of society.
Slave prices declined rapidly on farms, where slaves were replaced by wage workers long before the legal abolition of slavery in 1894.
Heeho Kim
nature humanities and social sciences communications
19 October 2022
既に2025/1/3に2回に分けてメモ済みのこの論文の先行研究紹介部分についてメモ追加する。1867年時点での奴隷数（全国ベース）について、10万人とする場合と167万とする極度の差が本文と注に生じていることを見落としていた。
ただし、
①この論文の本文で言及している10万人とするchoi 1974の論文については、論文自体が入手できない
②この論文の注で言及している167万人とする1977年の論文についても同様に入手できないが、全国ベース推計値であることは確実
彼らはやはり集団としてDNAに重大な欠陥を有する集団としか言いようがない。従って、消滅は免れ得ない。今日に至るまで、集団として存続しえたこと自体がむしろ奇跡的であろう。
ただし、
①この論文の本文で言及している10万人とするchoi 1974の論文については、論文自体が入手できない
②この論文の注で言及している167万人とする1977年の論文についても同様に入手できないが、全国ベース推計値であることは確実
彼らはやはり集団としてDNAに重大な欠陥を有する集団としか言いようがない。従って、消滅は免れ得ない。今日に至るまで、集団として存続しえたこと自体がむしろ奇跡的であろう。
Introduction
Slavery in Korea has been documented from the Three Kingdoms period (BC 57–AD 668) 1.1
See Lee Ki-baik (1968) for further information on slavery in various periods of Korean History.
Subsequently, the government conferred these public slaves to the noble class in the nineth and tenth centuries, thus engendering the practice of privately owned slaves. 2
2
Only the noble class were allowed to own slaves during the Sung dynasty of China (960–1279).
Slavery in Korea was distinct from that in Africa, wherein enslavement was usually through kidnapping and seizing (e.g., Nunn, 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011).3
Nunn N (2008) The long-term effects of Africa’s slave trades”.
Nunn N, Wantchekon L (2011) The slave trade and the origins of mistrust in Africa.
People in the Chosun era (1392–1910) of Korea were divided into four social classes that were determined by heredity: the elites (Yangban), the middle class (Chungin), commoners (Sangmin), and slaves (Nobi).5
5
A new working class, the Korean Chonmin, emerged in the fourteenth and fifteenth century as large farmlands were developed. They were not slaves but free men who had to work to sustain their livelihoods; thus, they were economically enslaved. However, they disappeared soon after the enactment of the Jongcheon law in 1430.
While the government owned numerous public slaves during this period (e.g., 450,000 slaves in 1467),slaves were also privately owned by the elites, middle class, and commoners.
The Jongcheon law between 1430 and 1731 stated that a child was a slave if either parent was a slave, regardless of the status of the other parent
6.
See Hong (1981) for changes in the slave population in Chosun-era Korea.
The population of slaves varied over the period, ranging from 25–40% of the total population prior to 1731 (Kwon and Shin, 1977).7
7
According to Kwon and Shin (1977), the total population of Korea in the early eighteenth century was estimated to have increased from 16.3 million in 1717 to 18.5 million in 1804. However, it dramatically dropped down to 16.2 million in 1825 due to pandemics and civil wars, and then went back to 16.7 million in 1867.
The Korean government changed the regulations governing slaves’ status in 1731 by switching from the Jongcheon law to the Jongyang law. The new slave regulation, Jongyang, stated that a child was a slave only if the mother was a slave, regardless of the status of the child’s father.
This effectively elevated some children—who otherwise would have been potential slaves—to a tax-paying, commoner status.
The dramatic decrease in the number of slaves did not satisfy the small ruling elite class (e.g., Choi, 1978; Ji, 1995).8
8
Refer to Choi (1978) and Ji (1995) for state policy regarding slavery during early Chosun-era Korea.
Notably, slavery was officially abolished in 1894 by law (Gapo).
This conflict would lead to a shift in the institution of slavery towards an alternative equilibrium (North, 1990; Ogilvie, 2007). 9
9
In a conflict-based approach to institutional change, Ogilvie (2007) states that economies with similar resources and technologies develop along different paths because of the game rules in a society or distribution effects of institutions. Institutions affect economic efficiency and the distribution of resources. Some groups want to maintain the current institutions and others want change. The results of this conflict are affected by its distributional implication for the most powerful individuals or groups (the elites or king). An efficient outcome is possible only when all social groups involved negotiate a binding agreement, but this assumes an enforcing party with a monopoly on physical violence. Since no other party can enforce the agreement, the party with a monopoly on the use of physical violence will be under constant temptation to use its capacity to cheat, exploit, or oppress others.
The number of slaves declined rapidly thereafter (Pyung, 1982; Park, 2007). The number of slaves in Korea is estimated to have been 6.9 million in the seventeenth century, declining to 0.1 million by 1867 (Choi, 1974).
This study explores the role of slave desertion to examine the relationship between the regulation change regarding children’s status as slaves,the institution of slavery, and society.
Our hypothesis posits that as more slaves deserted to the informal sectors, the costs of monitoring slaves increased.
Frequent slave desertions reduced slave demand, and dismantled the hierarchical status of society.
Slave prices declined rapidly on farms, where slaves were replaced by wage workers long before the legal abolition of slavery in 1894.
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